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Samantha Shoell*
INTRODUCTION
At this very moment there is an HIV/AIDS health crisis
facing developing countries. The HIV/AIDS crisis has caused,
and continues to cause, the deaths of millions of people.1
According to statistics, 95% of the world’s AIDS sufferers live in
the poorest countries in the world.2  In Thailand, AIDS is the
leading cause of death, and an estimated one million people
have the HIV virus.3  In addition, at least 580,000 Brazilians
are infected with HIV.4  However, Africa is the continent most
affected.  In 1997, Africa housed 21 million of the 30.6 million
people infected worldwide.5  It is estimated that in South
Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana almost one quarter of the
adult population is infected with AIDS.6  For the year 2000, in
South Africa, the “[y]oung people who died of natural causes . . .
* J.D. Candidate 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School
of Law; B.A. 2000, University of Utah.
1. See Kofi Annan, No Letting Up on AIDS, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001,
at A33. Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, says,
“[e]very day more than 8,000 people die of AIDS.  Every hour almost 600
people become infected.  Every minute a child dies of the virus.”  Id.  In
addition, “[a]bout 3 million AIDS deaths are expected this year.” David Brown,
AIDS Is Up Sharply in Eastern Europe, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A29.
2. See Alan Cassels, The Battle Against the Pharmaceutical Giants:
Drugs, Patents, and Health: the Achilles Heel of the WTO?, CCPA MONITOR
(June 2001), available at
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/articles/article287.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2002).
3. See Herman Reinhold, Patients v. Patents, 19 NEWSL., (A.B.A. Section
of Intell. Prop. Law), 2001, at 1.
4. See id.
5. See id. This number has increased to a total of 40 million people living
with AIDS. See Annan, supra note 1.
6. As to the statistic on South Africa, see Jon Jeter, Challenging S.
Africa’s AIDS Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at A25. As to the statistics on
Zimbabwe and Botswana, see Reinhold, supra note 3, at 1.
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outnumbered the old.”7  Death causes anguish, but premature
death is especially devastating for any hope of economic
development. Many businesses in Africa hire three workers for
every two jobs because AIDS-related deaths are so rampant.8
According to Joe Sills, a co-chairman of a taskforce studying
employment during the current crisis, it costs a fortune for a
corporation to train their middle management because “these
people drop like flies from AIDS.”9  As of October 19, 2001,
“AIDS has become the leading cause of death in South Africa,”
and by 2010 between five and seven million people will die as a
result.10  Undoubtedly, developing countries, especially those in
Africa, are suffering from a HIV/AIDS crisis that will continue
into the future.
WTO Director-General Mike Moore, voiced the thoughts of
many when he said, “[u]rgently, more needs to be done to save
the lives of millions of poor people.”11  Part of the problem is
that “[t]he poor cannot afford expensive medicines.”12  In one
year a single drug therapy may cost between $4,800 and $7,100
wholesale, and multiple drug therapy may cost between
$11,000 and $15,000.13  Moreover, the standard of care for a
patient is a “triple drug therapy.”14  Although costly, AIDS
infected citizens in “developed nations can receive an array of
medicines to delay the onset of symptoms.”15  However, the poor
7. Jeter, supra note 6.
8. See John Donnelly, Activists Hope Firms’ Involvement Boosts Battle
Against AIDS in Africa, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 4, 2001, at D1.
9. Id.
10. Jeter, supra note 6.
11. Mike Moore, Yes, Drugs for the Poor – and Patents as Well,
INT’L.HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 22, 2001, at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/news_e/news01_e/tn_dg_iht_feb2001_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2002).  Another part of the problem facing HIV/AIDS
suffers is that many developing countries lack the infrastructure to bring care
and medicines to patients.  See New Medical Facility Will Train Health
Providers From All of Africa, 11 AIDS READER 364, at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/410408.  See also Barton Gellman, An
Unequal Calculus of Life and Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at A18.  A
Roche distributor states that, “‘huge quantities’ of medicine donated to
Zimbabwe reached expiration and had to be destroyed.” Although there are
many problems, this comment will limit its discussion to the access of
HIV/AIDS medicines.  Id.
12. Moore, supra note 11.
13. See Reinhold, supra note 3, at 4.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsory Licensing Provision Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 951
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in developing countries cannot afford HIV/AIDS medicines.16  In
Zimbabwe, the cost of keeping an AIDS patient alive for a year
is twenty-four times the average income.17  In South Africa,
physicians “do not mention those remedies to their [AIDS]
patients because they know that the patients cannot afford the
drugs.”18  The poverty in these nations “means that neither the
poor nor their governments can afford to purchase the essential
medicines, or ensure their proper use in well-run health
systems.”19  Unfortunately, the inability to afford even a “single
drug therapy” causes many in developing countries to suffer
and die.
The cost of HIV/AIDS medicines is extremely high for a
number of reasons.  A study from Tufts University released in
2001 explains that the factors contributing to the high cost of a
new prescription drug include: research, development, and
inflation.20  Due to these factors, the corporate boards of
pharmaceutical companies, with the approval of public
authorities, have not lowered the price of AIDS medicines.21
Additionally, because the economies of most developing
countries are weak, “there may be insufficient foreign currency
reserves to pay the royalties and provide essential services.”22
Because of the high medicine prices and poverty in developing
countries, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United
Nations, set up the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria.23  To effectively reduce the rate of HIV infections in
poorer African and Asian countries the “fund will require $7
billion to $10 billion.”24
If and when the Global Fund reaches $7 to $10 billion, and
(2000).
16. Paul Blustein and Barton Gellman, HIV Drug Prices Cut for Poorer
Countries, WASH. POST, March 8, 2001, at A1.
17. Moore, supra note 11.
18. Ford, supra note 15, at 951.
19. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for
Economic Development, Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health, World Health Organization, Geneva, at 86 (Dec. 20, 2001).
20. RX Drugs: New Study Estimates Development Costs at $802M, AM.
HEALTH LINE: NAT. J. GROUP, Dec. 3, 2001.
21. See Gellman, supra note 11.
22. Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing
Countries: US Efforts To Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 569, 576 (1994).
23. See Senate Approves Funding of International Anti-AIDS Efforts,
REUTERS MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 25, 2001.
24. Id.
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the “adequate donor financing is available, drug pricing by
pharmaceutical companies (especially for drugs under patent)
can be a significant obstacle.”25  Brazil’s Health Minister Jose
Serra states that, “[t]he drugs’ prices are about 10 times their
cost.”26  He continues by insisting that the high cost is not
necessary to finance investment and research.27  Rather, he
states that the “trouble is, the patent for AIDS drugs
represents a pure monopoly condition in what’s become a global
epidemic.”28  In other words, through patent protection,
pharmaceutical companies are able to set high prices to recoup
production costs and to maintain profit margins, especially in
their rich-country markets.29  In addition, in the year 2005,
members of the World Trade Organization will be required to
implement a “harmonized” patent system that will provide
consistent patent protection in each country.30  However,
developing countries without capabilities to produce generics
under a compulsory license and with only the finances from the
Global Fund, which has only reached $2 billion, are bound by
patents to pay expensive prices for medicines or let their
populations die.
This comment will explore the problem presented by the
nexus of patents, high cost drugs, and poor developing
countries.  Part I explains the history of patent law and Trade-
Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS).
Part II of this comment delves into the different interpretations
of TRIPS presented by both the developing and developed
countries.  It also examines the effects of the Declaration
presented at the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial
meeting.  Part III discusses a solution based upon both the
developing and developed countries’ ultimate goals.
25. Sachs, supra note 19, at 87.
26. Roy Wadia, Brazil’s AIDS Policy Earns Global Plaudits, (Aug. 16,
2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/08/14/brazil.AIDS/index.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Sachs, supra note 19, at 87.
30. Id. at 87.
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I. HISTORY OF TRIPS
A. THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
Ideas and knowledge, or intellectual property, is “bought
and sold because of the information and creativity [it]
contain[s].”31  The value of vaccinations, medicines, and other
inventions lies in the innovation, research, and testing
involved.32  “However, in the absence of legal protection, there
is nothing to prevent someone from copying the invention and
using it.”33  As a result, the copier’s competition diminishes the
inventor’s ability to enjoy, use, and sell the invention for
profit.34  In addition, the copier has “the advantage of being able
to compete without bearing the investment, time or effort
necessary for the discovery.”35  Therefore, the inventor loses
profit and is not encouraged to search for and discover new
inventions to benefit society.36  Intellectual property law was
created to eliminate copying, allowing the inventor to recoup
costs and make a profit as an incentive to make new
discoveries.37
Patent law, a subset of intellectual property law, provides
similar legal protection for “intangible” items that was formerly
afforded only to manual labor and tangible items.38  A patent is
a contract between the government and the inventor.39  The
government provides “the inventor a monopoly to the
enjoyment of his or her invention in return for disclosure of the
invention to the public.”40  The monopoly that is created for the
inventor restricts copying and provides a means for the
inventor to recoup his original investment and make a profit.41
Allowing for the recuperation of the original investment is also
31. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2002).
32. See id.
33. David Benjamin Snyder, Comment, South Africa’s Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act: A Spoonful of Sugar or a Bitter
Pill to Swallow?, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 175, 178 (1999).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 179.
37. See id. at 178-79.
38. See Kirchanski, supra note 22, at 570.
39. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 179.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 178-179.
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an incentive for the inventor to make new discoveries.42  In
addition, disclosure assists other inventors in searching and
thinking about what is covered by the patent, which helps them
create additional advances and new discoveries benefiting
society.43  Aside from the incentives and assistance that patent
law provides, it is important to understand that patent law
does not deny society anything that it enjoyed freely prior to
the grant of the patent.44  Moreover, patent protection ends
after a certain time, after which anyone may manufacture the
product.45
B. PATENT PROTECTION PRIOR TO TRIPS
On a national level, patent law was first granted in
Renaissance Italy based on two ideas: “(1) [i]t is morally right
to give an inventor the exclusive right to exploit the fruits of his
own mind; and (2) protection allows him to recoup costs
incurred in research, providing an incentive to create useful
new products for society.”46  In accordance with these
provisions, many countries enacted patent laws by the 1870s.47
In addition, international trade expressed a need for
international patent law.  In 1878, an “international congress
gathered to discuss the prospects of an agreement to extend
protection to foreigners.”48  As a result of this discussion, the
Paris Convention was created in 1883.49  The Paris Convention
gave foreign inventors national treatment equal to what a
domestic inventor would receive and the exclusive right to file
for the patent in multiple countries within one year without
having to race would-be copiers who may be locals of each
country.50  Although the Paris Convention provided patent
42. Id. at 179.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS] (stating patent expires after 20 years).
45. For example, TRIPS patent protection expires after 20 years.  Id. at
Art. 33.
46. George K. Foster, Comment, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in
International Patent Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round
and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 283, 285 (1998).
47. See id.
48. Id. at 285-86.
49. See id. at 286.
50. See id.
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protection, it lacked both a standard degree of protection
among all the member states, as well as enforcement provisions
to ensure a remedy if a member state violated a provision.
With recent advances in medical technology, the U.S.
needed more protection than the Paris Convention could offer.
Notably, the U.S. economy was and is “increasingly moving
away from basic manufacturing to high-technology
industries.”51  In the last twenty years, the U.S. has developed
almost one half of the commercial pharmaceutical drugs in the
world.52  The process to create, develop, and commercialize a
drug is extremely expensive.  In 1990, the U.S. government
estimated that “a single new drug took ten to twelve years to
come to market at a cost of $359 million.”53  The pharmaceutical
industry receives 40% of its income from exporting drugs.54
However, “foreign companies that copy and reproduce patented
pharmaceuticals take away $5 billion in sales from
pharmaceutical companies.”55  If not for lost revenues, the
pharmaceutical industry would have another $720 to $900
million to invest in research and development.56  This
investment could result in the discovery of additional vaccines
and medicines.57  Due to this lost revenue, the pharmaceutical
companies “began a sustained campaign to make expanded
patent protection a priority of U.S. trade policy.”58  In other
words, pharmaceutical companies campaigned for more order,
predictability, and enforcement to be introduced into an
internationally–agreed-upon trade rule.59
C. TRIPS
As a result of the campaign, the U.S. government invited
representatives from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
51. See John A. Harrelson, Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, And
The HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Compassion, 7 WIDENER. L. SYMP. J. 175, 183 (2001).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 184.
54. Id. at 183.
55. Id. at 184.
56. Id. See also Foster, supra note 46, at 298 (citing International Trade
Commission figures which state that if it were not for lost revenues from
copiers, that “innovators would invest $720 to $900 million more annually” in
research and development).
57. See Foster, supra note 46, at 298.
58. Id. at 298.
59. See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 31.
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Association to attend the Uruguay Round negotiations.60  On
April 15, 1994, 117 countries signed the Uruguay Round
Agreement, which was conducted under the umbrella of the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, now succeeded by the
World Trade Organization (WTO).61  This agreement included
the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights
(TRIPS), which became effective January 1, 1995.62  TRIPS
offers the “protection conferred in the Paris Convention (as
Article 2 expressly requires member to adhere to that accord),
but go[es] much further in almost every respect.”63
As noted above, the Paris Convention lacked a standard
degree of protection and enforcement.64  TRIPS addressed those
issues.65  Prior to TRIPS, few developed countries had strong
intellectual property protection laws;66 and many developing
countries “maintained weak intellectual property protection
because, among other things, they felt strong patent protection
would protect foreigners at the expense of local producers.”67
TRIPS became the starting point to harmonize the patent laws
of both developed and developing signatory nations.68  In
addition, TRIPS allows intellectual property rights to be
enforced by trade sanctions.69  As a result, intellectual property
rights and trade “were formally linked on a global basis.”70
Also, pharmaceutical drugs, which many countries did not
recognize as patentable, became patentable subject matter.71
60. See Foster, supra note 46, at 299.
61. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 175-76.
62. Id. at 179.
63. Foster, supra note 46, at 289.
64. See supra Part I.B., para. 2.
65. See Foster, supra note 46, at 289 (explaining that Article 27 obligates
all members to make patents available for “any inventions, whether products
or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application”).
66. See id. at 288.  “Most regional agreements required simply that the
members adhere to the Paris Convention; the only one that went beyond
this—the European Patent Convention—did not extend beyond Europe and
thus could not address inventors’ global concerns.” Id.
67. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 179.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. at 175.
71. See id. at 179. There are also transition periods for the developing and
least developed countries. Pharmaceutical Patents and the TRIPS Agreement
(July 11, 2000) at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/pharma_ato186_e.htm
[hereinafter Pharmaceutical Patents].
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Although many developing countries had “reservations
about strengthening intellectual property rights, [they] signed
the TRIPS agreement because international trade was of major
importance to their economic growth.”72  In other words, only
after signing TRIPS would the developing countries be able to
participate in the WTO, which is essential in order to realize
economic growth.73  Furthermore, it is believed that strong
intellectual property protection laws “stimulate[] economic
growth and enhance[] social welfare.”74  Growth may be
stimulated by increasing investments due to the exclusivity
provided by patent protection.75
The TRIPS agreement attempts to balance long-term social
objectives with short-term social objectives.76  Article 7 of
TRIPS notes that the objectives are to contribute to the
promotion of technological innovations and transfer in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare.77  Enforcing
intellectual property rights aids the patentee in recovering
development costs and receiving profit.78  Protection also
encourages inventors to create new drugs because they can
expect to earn future benefits from their creativity.79  In
addition to receiving protection, TRIPS mandates in Article 29,
paragraph 1, disclosure of the patented material.80  Disclosure
allows other inventors to study the drug while it is patented,
thereby avoiding the re-invention of the wheel.81  As a result,
the time between developing new drugs is minimized,
potentially saving more lives and maximizing health.
Additionally, patent protection does not deny society vaccines
or medicines that it enjoyed freely prior to the grant of the
patent.
Article 8 notes that social objectives allow for exceptions to
72. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 176.
73. Id.
74. Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the
TRIPS Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries
Toward the Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 47 (1998).
75. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 188-89.
76. Philosophy: TRIPS Attempts to Strike a Balance (April 2001), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm01_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Philosophy].
77. TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 7.
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. Philosophy, supra note 76.
80. TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 29, para. 1.
81. Philosophy, supra note 76.
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the patent holder’s rights when necessary to protect public
health.82  Members of TRIPS may make an exception during
certain circumstances, one of these being a “national
emergenc[y].”83  However, the exception may only be used
“provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner.”84  Therefore, other members may enforce their property
protection rights through the Dispute Resolution Board of the
WTO.85  Ultimately, TRIPS contains a “carefully-negotiated
balance between providing intellectual property protection—
which is essential if new medicines and treatments are to be
developed—and allowing countries the flexibility to ensure
treatments reach the world’s poorest and most vulnerable
people.”86
II. TRIPS AND THE HIV/AIDS CRISIS
Due to the HIV/AIDS crisis facing developing countries and
the lack of affordable medicines, critics argue that TRIPS lacks
balance between its long and short-term social objectives and
therefore should be completely eliminated.87  Nonetheless, the
support for TRIPS extends throughout a majority of the WTO
countries.88  The Chairperson of the first special discussion on
Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines stated, “I think I
can safely say that all members are determined to ensure that
82. TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 8.
83. Philosophy, supra note 76, (referring to TRIPS Article 8).
84. Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 71.
85. To date there has not been a case regarding compulsory licensing of
pharmaceutical patents brought in front of the Dispute Resolution Board.
Harrelson, supra note 51, at 183.  However, “[t]he United States has come
under fire for initiating a WTO dispute settlement case against Brazil’s patent
legislation, which Washington says obliges holders of patents in Brazil to
ensure that their products are ‘worked’ in Brazil (either produced locally or
licensed for production in Brazil) in violation of TRIPS provision.”
Pharmaceuticals: U.S. Commitment on TRIPS Limits Welcomed by WHO
Director-General, BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, (May 18, 2001).  This
case was later dropped.  AIDS RX: U.S. Drops WTO Complaint Over Brazilian
Generics, American Health Line, NAT. J. GROUP, (June 27, 2001).
86. WTO Members to Press On, Following ‘Rich Debate’ on Medicines,
WTO News: 2001 Press Release  (June 22, 2001) (quoting WTO Director
General Mike Moore), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr233_e.htm (last visited Sept.
16, 2001) [hereinafter Members to Press On].
87. See Moore, supra note 11.
88. See Members to Press On, supra note 86.
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the TRIPS Agreement is part of the solution . . . [to meet] the
public health crises in poor countries.  That includes the
HIV/AIDS crisis in my own continent of Africa.”89  Therefore,
instead of arguing whether TRIPS should be eliminated,
countries have narrowed their arguments to the interpretation
of TRIPS exceptions.90
A. VAGUE ARTICLES OF TRIPS NEED INTERPRETATION
The need for a definite interpretation of TRIPS exceptions
motivated the African Group to request an item on the agenda
of the regular meetings of the WTO Council on TRIPS.91  As a
result, the June 20, 2001, meeting included a special discussion
on Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines.92  At this
meeting, the European Union (EU) and the developing
countries offered papers that discussed the relation between
TRIPS and access to medicines.93  During the discussion of
these papers, the developing countries requested an
interpretation of TRIPS “which would allow governments to
pursue health policies in the secure knowledge that they would
not be violating TRIPS.”94  It was also requested that this
interpretation be underscored by a political declaration at the
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, 2001.95  No
country at the meeting objected to such a declaration in Doha.96
Soon after, drafts for the ministerial declaration were offered
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 86, 88-89 and accompanying text.
91. See Governments Share Interpretations on TRIPS and Public Health,
WTO News: 2001 News Item (June 20, 2001) at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/trips_drugs_010620_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2002)  [hereinafter Governments Share Interpretations].
92. See id.
93. EU’s paper, TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines (June
20, 2001), at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_eu_w280_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter EU’s paper]; Developing Country Group’s
Paper, TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines (June 19, 2001)
(submitted by the Africa Group, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay,
Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_develop_w296_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 16, 2001).
94. Governments Share Interpretations, supra note 91.
95. Id.
96. See id.
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by the developing nations, developed nations, and Hong Kong.97
These ministerial declaration drafts discussed each country’s
interpretation of the TRIPS provisions relating to the access of
medicines, and were then received by the General Council
Chairperson’s consultants.98
B. MINISTERIAL DECLARATION DRAFTS INTERPRETING TRIPS
The ministerial declaration draft composed by the
developing countries addressed the “inability of large segments
of the population to obtain medicines and treatments at prices
they can afford.”99  They proposed that, “[n]othing in the TRIPS
Agreement shall prevent Members from taking measures to
protect public health.”100  Draft provisions included both
parallel importing and compulsory licensing with other
countries as approaches to meet the demand for medicines.101
Additionally, the draft provisions stated that other countries
should refrain from imposing or threatening to impose
sanctions.102  Ultimately, these draft provisions seek to define
the qualifications of the exceptions in TRIPS, thereby granting
a government the opportunity to obtain medicines legally.103
1. Parallel Importing
The first provision addressing an exception within TRIPS
relates to parallel importing. Parallel imports are not
counterfeit products or illegal copies.104  Parallel import
97. Draft Ministerial Declaration, Proposal from a Group of Developed
Countries, TRIPS: Proposal (Oct. 4, 2001) (submitted by Australia, Canada,
Japan, Switzerland and the U.S.), at http://www.patentmatics.com/pub54.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Developed Countries]; Draft Ministerial
Declaration, Proposal from a Group of Developing Countries, TRIPS: Proposal
(Oct. 4, 2001), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/mindecdraft_w312_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Developing Countries]; Members Discuss
Drafts For Ministerial Declaration, WTO News: 2001 News Item (Sept. 19-21,
2001) (Hong Kong China also circulated a draft), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/trips_drugs_010919_e.htm
[hereinafter Members Discuss Drafts].
98. See Members Discuss Drafts, supra note 97.
99. Developing Countries, supra note 97.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Obligations and Exceptions, Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical
Patents, at
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products are marketed by the patent owner in one country, and
imported to another country with approval of the country, but
not the patent owner.105  The concept of parallel imports is
centered on the exhaustion of patent rights and protection.106
Exhaustion occurs after the first sale, after the patent holder
loses the right to royalties and after patent protection ends for
the item sold.107  After a patent becomes exhausted, “the initial
purchaser may resell the goods without infringing on the
patent held by the original seller.”108
Sellers who are not authorized by the patent owner may be
in direct competition with the authorized sellers in that
country.109  Unauthorized sellers may be able to offer lower
prices and eventually force the authorized sellers out of
business for several reasons: First, the unauthorized seller can
search a number of countries to find the lowest price and resell
the product in the highest priced country.110  On the other hand,
the authorized seller must acquire the product in the country
from the patent owner, at the price set by the patent owner.111
Second, the unauthorized seller can capitalize on the currency
fluctuations of other countries.112  Third, the unauthorized
seller gets the advantage of promotional and advertising
campaigns paid for by the authorized seller without any cost.113
Finally, the unauthorized seller’s duties and expenses end after
the sale, whereas the authorized seller may be responsible for
the expense of servicing the goods.114
Although unauthorized sellers may create direct
competition, potentially causing injury to the authorized seller,
application of the first sale doctrine is limited to each country.
According to European Union law, the “first sale of a product in
any European Union member country exhausts the patentee’s
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Obligations and Exceptions].
105. Id.
106. See Hillary A. Kremen, Note, Caveat Venditor: International
Application of the First Sale Doctrine, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 161,
162 (1997).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 161.
110. See id. at 161-62.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 162.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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rights.”115  For example, if a patent protected drug is first sold
in Spain at a reasonably low price, it can be resold in France,
without the patentee’s consent, for a profit.116  However, if a
generic version of the same drug is bought in India, it cannot be
resold in Spain without the patentee’s consent.117
Distinct from the European Union, the U.S. does not allow
parallel imports.  Rather, in Boesch v. Graff,118 the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether a dealer
residing in the United States can purchase in another country
articles patented there, from a person authorized to sell them,
and import them to and sell them in the United States, without
the license or consent of the owners of the United States
patent.”119  The Court held that, although the laws of one
country allow the selling of a product, this fact did not
authorize the selling of “articles in the United States in
defiance of the rights of patentees under a United States
patent.”120  In addition, Congress passed legislation in October
of 2000 that “authorized the reimportation of patented
pharmaceutical products from Canada into the United States,
subject to approval from the Department of Health and Human
Services.”121  However, Donna Shalala, then Secretary of Health
and Human Services, refused to authorize the reimports for
fear that parallel imported “pharmaceuticals would not meet
United States safety standards.”122  Thus, each country
determines its law regarding parallel import products.
TRIPS fails to definitively harmonize the concept of
115. Rosemary Sweeny, Comment, The U.S. Push for Worldwide Patent
Protection for Drugs Meets the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating
Collision, 9 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 445, 456 n.102 (2000).
116. See id.
117. See id. (citing Harold C. Wegner, Parallel Imports of Patented Goods
Killing the Technology Transfer Goose, 14-18, 23 (Presentation at the Fordham
University School of Law, Sixth Annual Conference on International
Intellectual Property Law & Policy, Apr. 16-17, 1998)).
118. 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
119. Id. at 702.
120. Id. at 703.
121. Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray
Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 793-794 (2001)
(referring to Congressional Legislation Oct. 2000 on reimports, H.R. Conf. Ref.
No. 106-984, at 39 (2001) (“Making appropriations for Agriculture Rural
Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Programs
for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 2001, and for Other Purposes,” amending
21 U.S.C. 381 et seq.)).
122. Id. at 794.
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exhaustion amongst member countries.  Exhaustion is
identified by Article 6, which states that, subject to provisions 3
and 4 which deal with non-discrimination, “nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights.”123  If there are conflicts between
nations concerning exhaustion, they are to be “resolved
bilaterally between individual nations.”124  Thus, as a matter of
law, in the absence of a definition granted by TRIPS, parallel
importation remains an “entirely domestic legal concern.”125
With respect to parallel importing, the developing
countries’ draft states, “[e]ach Member retains the right to
establish its own policy and rules regarding the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.”126  The concept of parallel
importing is attractive to many developing nations, including
South Africa, because they lack “sufficient manufacturing
resources [that prevent] compulsory licensing from being a
viable solution to the high cost of pharmaceuticals.”127  In
addition, parallel importing coincides with GATT’s objective of
limiting “restrictions on the free movement of goods.”128  Thus,
any limits or restrictions on parallel importing “collide with
free trade, [and] the WTO should favor open trade.”129
Consequently, developing countries prefer the concept of
parallel importing to compulsory licensing as a means to obtain
medicines for HIV/AIDS patients.
Although poorer populations are in desperate need for
HIV/AIDS medicines, parallel importing may not be the best
solution.  The developed countries of the EU, U.S. and
Switzerland warn that parallel imports into higher-priced
markets could reduce profits and undermine “differential
pricing.”130  Differential pricing occurs when companies sell
123. Obligations and Exceptions, supra note 104.
124. Kremen, supra note 106, at 174.
125. Duane Nash, South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act of 1997, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485, 494 (2000).
126. Developing Countries, supra note 97.
127. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 177.
128. Id. at 195.
129. Id.  The WTO was created to promote free trade by reducing and
eventually limiting the restrictions on the movement of goods between
countries. Due to exhaustion’s ability to limit the movement of a product form
one country into another country, it can be described as colliding with free
trade.  See id.
130. Governments Share Interpretations, supra note 91.
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drugs at lower prices to poorer markets.131  Humanitarianism is
cited as the main reason for lower prices.132  Recently, price-
cutting for poorer countries has become very common.  As of
April 5, 2001, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated
that six major drug companies agreed, “to keep cutting prices of
AIDS treatments for the world’s poorest nations.”133  In
addition, pharmaceutical companies have negotiated with
countries to reduce prices.  For example, negotiations between
Roche pharmaceutical company and Brazil cut the price of
nelfinavir by 40 percent.134  GlaxoSmithKline Plc handed over
its rights on AZT, 3TC and Combivir to a South African generic
drug firm.135  Pfizer pharmaceutical company has agreed to
donate to South Africa a powerful anti-fungal agent that nearly
one in ten African AIDS patients require.136  Boehringer
Ingelheim is willing to give anti-HIV nevirapine, which blocks
the transmission of the virus from infected mothers to their
newborn babies, absolutely free to poor countries.137  These
examples show that price-cutting or differential pricing exists
and is helping poorer countries receive HIV/AIDS medicines.
Although developing countries want to parallel import
cheaper medicines into their markets, some developed
countries fear that the low priced medicines will flow into
developed countries’ markets and undermine differential
pricing.138  This may cause a variety of problems.  First, parallel
importing of lower priced medicines into developed nations
would reduce pharmaceutical companies’ profits, thereby
decreasing the incentive to continue research and
131. See WTO/WHO Seminar in Norway Examines Case for Using Tiered
Pricing for Medicines, BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT, Apr. 13, 2001.
132. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 194.
133. Annan Renews Push for Lower AIDS Treatment Costs, REUTERS
NEWMEDIA, Oct. 5, 2001, available at
http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2001/RE011004.html. “Nine months later,
however, agreements have been reached with only three countries.” Karl Vick,
Kenyan Orphanage Takes Initiative on AIDS Drugs, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
2001, at A12.
134. John Donnelly, Brazil Wins Big Price Cut in AIDS Drug, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2001, at A1.
135. Ben Hirschler, Glaxo Gives up Rights to AIDS Drugs in South Africa,
REUTERS NEWMEDIA, Oct. 6, 2001, at
http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2001/RE011009.html.
136. Gellman, supra note 11, at A18.
137. Laurie Garrett, Drugmakers Aid In War on AIDS / Controversy Rages
Over Distribution, NEWSDAY, July 9, 2000, at A6.
138. Governments Share Interpretations, supra note 91.
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development.139  The market prices for most medicines are
considerably high in developed countries.140  As a result, there
is “a major financial incentive . . . for distributors to buy the
lower priced pharmaceuticals in developing countries and resell
(i.e., parallel import) the pharmaceuticals in developed
countries where the market price [is] considerably higher.”141
However, these markets are where pharmaceutical companies
receive the “bulk” of their profits.142  Therefore, parallel
importing lower priced drugs to developed nations would
reduce pharmaceutical companies’ profits, resulting in the lack
of funds needed for the research and development of new drugs.
Second, parallel importing of cheaper medicines from poor
to rich countries could put “downward pressure on the global
price, [and] then the core markets of the pharmaceutical
industry are at risk.”143  However, pharmaceutical companies
are concerned “about maintaining profit margins in wealthy
nations.”144  As a result of this downward pressure,
pharmaceutical companies may respond by equalizing prices
for all nations, therefore reducing the profitability of parallel
imports.145  However, equalizing prices would end differential
pricing and once again raise the price of medicines beyond the
reach of developing nations.
Third, parallel importing could result in needed medicines
not reaching the sick in developing nations.  In order to resell a
particular drug it must leave the developing country that it was
supposed to help.146  Therefore, the infected populations may
not receive the medicines they desperately need.147
Finally, there is a substantial risk that parallel imports
that arrive at developing nations are unsafe or counterfeit.
Parallel imports may drastically lower prices and make
medicines more accessible to poorer populations.148  However,
developing countries may not be able to ensure the safety of
139. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 194.
140. See id. at 196.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gellman, supra note 11, at A18.
144. Reinhold, supra note 3, at 5.
145. See Harrelson, supra note 51, at 196.
146. Common sense explains that a drug can only be at one place at a time,
and if it is in the developed country, then it is not helping the poor in the
developing country.
147. See generally Harrelson, supra note 51.
148. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 196.
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these imported medicines.149  For example, “‘South Africa’s
border guards are unable to staunch the flow of illegal
immigrants, cocaine, endangered species and even rustled
cattle,’ and that they would be even less effective against
‘counterfeit drugs that have expired and were supposed to be
destroyed but were just repackaged.’”150  Kenya, a developing
country, recently banned imports due to the problems of
“ascertaining whether parallel imports had been produced in
accordance with good manufacturing practice, and [the
manufacturer’s] inability to recall unsafe products.”151
Although developing countries do not have the HIV/AIDS
medicines they need, allowing parallel imports without means
to ensure safety will only harm the poorer populations.
As a result of the potential injuries created by parallel
importing, the developed nations’ ministerial declaration draft
“encourage[s] Members, whatever the exhaustion regime that
they may have chosen, to take measures to prevent
pharmaceuticals provided to the poorest populations of the
globe under discounted pricing schemes or supplied under aid-
schemes from being diverted.”152  In other words, because
developed nations would like differential pricing to continue,
the draft encourages all nations to prevent parallel importing.
2. Compulsory Licensing
The second draft provision addressing an exception within
TRIPS relates to compulsory licensing.  “A compulsory license
is ‘an involuntary contract between a willing buyer and an
unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the state.’”153  The
government grants the license, of a particular patented
product, to a manufacturer without consent of the patent
holder.154  Medicines made under a compulsory license could be
referred to as generic because they are “drugs that are not
149. Id. at 191-92. (stating that, Kenya, a developing country,
“experimented with allowing parallel imports, recently banned them citing an
abundance of unsafe and counterfeit drugs”).
150. Id. at 192 (quoting Donald G. McNeil, Jr., South Africa’s Bitter Pill for
World’s Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at Section 3, p.1).
151. Id.
152. Developed Countries, supra note 97.
153. Nash, supra note 125, at 489 (quoting Gianna Julian-Arnold,
International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA
349 (1993).
154. Obligations and Exceptions, supra note 104.
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produced under patent.”155  However, this term is usually
reserved for drugs made outside patent protection by countries
that do not have patent laws.156
Members who have signed TRIPS disallow the creation of
generic drugs before the patent is exhausted except in the form
of compulsory licensing.157  Strict laws surrounding generic
manufacture resulted from developed countries negotiating at
the Uruguay Round.  One of the main goals was “to secure a
restriction on the application of compulsory licenses.”158
Although the term compulsory licensing is not specifically
mentioned, TRIPS discusses “other use[s] of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder” in
detail.159  Compulsory licensing under the TRIPS agreement
requires that a government fulfill a number of conditions prior
to exercising the license.160  One of which is first attempting to
obtain a voluntary license.161  Another condition is that “the
right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the
circumstances of each case.”162
However, there is no need to obtain, or even try to obtain, a
voluntary license if the reason for the license falls under
certain special conditions.163  The special conditions in Article
31(b) include: national emergency, other circumstances of
extreme urgency, public non-commercial use (government use),
or anti-competitive practices.164  Eventually, however, the
155. What does “generic” mean?, at
 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm03_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2002).  However, often a product is generic because the “patent
has expired, or there never was a patent . . . [or] the drug is being copied
outside [of] patent protection, for example in a country that still does not
provide patent protection.” Id.
156. Id.
157. See TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 31.  See also Pharmaceutical
Patents, supra note 71 (stating that, under TRIPS, patent rights are not
absolute but can be subject to limits, including compulsory licenses).
158. McCabe, supra note 74, at 61.
159. Obligations and Exceptions, supra note 104 (citing TRIPS Agreement
Article 31).
160. Id. (citing TRIPS Agreement Article 31(a)-(l)).
161. Id. (stating that these requirements include first trying to receive
authorization from the patent holder, use must be limited to the scope and
duration authorized, and pay the right holder adequate remuneration (citing
TRIPS Agreement Article 31(a)-(l))).
162. Id. (citing TRIPS Agreement Article 31(h)).
163. Id. (citing TRIPS Agreement Article 31(b)).
164. Id.
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patent holder should be notified and receive remuneration.165
The developing countries’ draft, similar to TRIPS, states in
the “case of a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use,
Members may grant compulsory licenses without prior efforts
on the part of the user to obtain authorization from the right
holder.”166  Thus, developing countries could use compulsory
licensing to “decrease the price and make medical treatment
more affordable [for HIV/AIDS patients].”167  In addition,
according to the U.S., EU, and Japan, developing countries’
current problem with HIV/AIDS crisis is clearly a national
emergency.168  It seems that all parties agree that the
HIV/AIDS crisis is an emergency and, therefore, developing
countries should be able to manufacture generic medicines
through a local compulsory license.
However, many developing countries have not issued
compulsory licenses.  The denying of licenses may be a result of
pressure applied by developed countries because of fears
arising from TRIPS ambiguities.  Although TRIPS limits a
country’s issuance of a compulsory license to matters of
extreme urgency and although TRIPS states that remuneration
is eventually to be provided, TRIPS fails to specify what is
extremely urgent and what amount of remuneration is
adequate.169  Thus, “seemingly minor health risks [may] be
interpreted as extremely urgent, allowing for a wave of
compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals.”170  Also, seemingly
sufficient remuneration may be considered adequate when in
reality it “may imperil the pharmaceutical industry if widely
165. Id. (stating that notification should occur either as reasonably as
practical for national emergency, or promptly for government use) (citing
TRIPS Agreement Article 31(b)-(h)).
166. Developing Countries, supra note 97.
167. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 189.
168. Governments Share Interpretations, supra note 91.
169. TRIPS Agreement Article 31(b) only states that in “circumstances of
extreme urgency” may a Member use the subject matter of a patent without
authorization. It does not give clarification as to what constitutes as an
extreme urgency.  However, listed as other reasons why a Member may waive
the requirement of obtaining prior authorization are national emergency and
cases of non-commercial use. TRIPS, supra note 44. Also, TRIPS Agreement
Article 31(h) only states that the “right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration” by “taking into account the economic value of the
authorization.” Id.  It does not give further detail or specific dollar amounts.
170. Ford, supra note 15, at 966.
2002] WHY CAN’T THE POOR ACCESS MEDICINES 171
employed.”171  In other words, developed countries fear the
broad and vague terms in TRIPS; which may allow a country to
issue compulsory licenses for inadequate reasons and for
insufficient royalties to support the patent holders.172
The fear of compulsory licenses has caused developed
nations, primarily the U.S., to use pressure to discourage
compulsory licensing.173  Legal pressures that the U.S. uses
consist of the Generalized System of Preferences and Section
301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.174  Thus,
when disputes arise concerning compulsory licensing, countries
are wary of damaging relations with an important trading
partner175 and negotiate an agreement.  As a result, there has
yet to be an argument related to compulsory licensing before
the Dispute Resolution Board of the WTO.176  For example,
South Africa passed legislation stating that it permits the
government to license companies to manufacture generic
medicines.177  However, the act “can be read to permit activity
which is in violation of TRIPS.”178  As a result, “United States
Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky announced the
placement of South Africa on the Watch List for countries who
provide inadequate intellectual property right protection.”179
Similarly, the U.S. has “applied similar pressure to Argentina,
Brazil, and India when they considered intellectual property
bills that would authorize compulsory licensing of
pharmaceuticals.”180  As described, developed countries have
pressured developing countries to limit and prevent compulsory
licensing.
In addition, developed countries are pursuing, on a
171. See Nash, supra note 125, at 487.
172. See Ford, supra note 15, at 966.
173. Id. at 952-54 (referring to the pressure applied by the U.S. on South
Africa because of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment
Act that allowed for compulsory licensing and parallel importing).
174. Sweeny, supra note 115, at 458-59 (referring to the pressure applied
by the U.S. upon Thailand which caused Thailand to amend its Patent Act).
175. Ford, supra note 15, at 944.
176. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 183.
177. Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90
(1997) (S. Afr.).
178. Nash, supra note 125, at 494.
179. Snyder, supra note 33, at 176.  Shortly afterwards, President Clinton,
through an executive order, declared that the United States would not
implement trade policies that would deprive access to AIDS medication in
South Africa. See Harrelson, supra note 51, at 186.
180. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 186.
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country-by-country basis, even stricter laws concerning
compulsory licensing.  In an attempt to eliminate the ability of
nations to compulsory license, the U.S. has “attempted to
negotiate changes in the patent laws of numerous nations.”181
For example, Thailand’s Patent Act of 1992 arguably met all
the requirements of TRIPS.182  However, U.S. pressure resulted
in amendments that “narrowed the situations in which
compulsory licenses can be issued to produce generic versions
of AIDS drugs locally.”183  Also, the Jordan Free Trade
Agreement “went beyond TRIPS and ‘raised standards.’”184
According to Joe Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Intellectual Property, the U.S. is “seeking to
persuade the Chileans and the Singaporeans to agree to the
same provisions.”185  Hence, in order to limit compulsory
licensing, developed countries have pursued and pressured
other countries into implementing stricter laws.
In response, developing nations argue that the political
pressure applied by developed nations hinders their ability to
address public health issues.186  The developing countries’
ministerial declaration draft states that sanctions have the
ability to “curtail the ability of developing . . . country Members
to avail themselves of every possible policy option to protect
and promote public health.”187  Thus, the developing countries
suggest that the developed nations should “exercise utmost
restraint in initiating and pursuing dispute settlement
proceedings relating to measures adopted . . . to protect and
promote public health.”188  Ultimately, developing countries
desire to be secure in that the actions they take to promote
public health will not be sanctioned.
181. Id. at 183.
182. Sweeny, supra note 115, at 457.
183. Id. at 463.
184. Chris Rugaber, Cooperation, Enforcement, TRIPS Case Will Help
Protect IP Rights, Leader Says, 188 BNA DAILY R. FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 1,
2001, at A20 (quoting President Eric H. Smith of the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA)), available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ecommerce/2001q4/000604.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2002).
185. Id.
186. See Developing Countries, supra note 97.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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3. Issuing a Compulsory License to a Third Party
TRIPS is ambiguous as to whether a country may issue a
compulsory license to a producer in another country.  This third
party producer would then manufacture and export the
medicines back to the country that originally gave them the
compulsory license.189  Many developing countries, even if
justified under an exception to compulsory license, are unable
to make HIV/AIDS treatment drugs because “[t]hese drugs
require a sophistication of manufacture that, without
cooperation of the developers of the technology, is beyond the
capacity of many developing countries.”190  As a result,
developing countries want to use compulsory licensing for
import.  Developing countries who are authorized to issue
compulsory licenses but do not have the capabilities to do so,
would appoint a producer in another country to supply them
with medicines.  In their ministerial declaration drafts, both
the developing countries and Hong Kong mention appointing
another country for the production and exportation of drugs as
a means to address public health.191  The developing countries
supported their argument with Article 30 of TRIPS.192  They
claim that TRIPS authorizes such production and exportation
because these measures “do not infringe the rights of the
patent holder.”193  Therefore, issuing compulsory licenses to
another country to produce and export needed medicines
should be allowed.
However, further broadening and relaxing of TRIPS
restrictions on compulsory licensing to allow one country to
issue a compulsory license to another is unlikely to be agreed
189. TRIPS is silent as to giving a compulsory license to another country to
produce the medicines for a country that lacks the capabilities but is in
extreme urgency.  See TRIPS, supra note 44.  However, under article 31, after
fulfilling the stated requirements, Member states may allow for the use of the
patent by the government or third parties authorized by the government.  See
TRIPS, supra note 44.
190. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 192.
191. Developing Countries, supra note 97.  Hong Kong China also
circulated a draft.  See WTO News: 2001 News Items, Members discuss drafts
for ministerial declaration, Sept. 19-21, 2001 (claiming countries cannot
compulsorily license foreign companies, thus foreign governments will have to
cooperate), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news01_e/trips_drugs_010919_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2002).
192. Developing Countries, supra note 97.
193. Id.
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upon by the developed nations.194  Additionally, the TRIPS
agreement is ambiguous as to the exact place of manufacture.
Therefore, developed countries may seek to interpret TRIPS
according to Article 31(f).195  Article 31(f) states that a product
made under a compulsory license should be “predominantly for
the supply of the domestic market of the member authorizing
such use.”196  By interpreting the domestic market as both the
authorizing and supply country, the article then seems to limit
the location of production to the country authorizing a
compulsory license.
In addition, developed countries fear that a drug created
through a compulsory license will be a parallel import.197  South
Africa and other countries could issue a compulsory license that
could force pharmaceutical companies to compete “at rock
bottom prices, only to find that these drugs are then parallel
imported into other nations where they undercut the prices of
‘authorized’ suppliers.”198  Undercutting prices and profits
would harm pharmaceutical companies and developed
countries.199  Thus, it is unlikely that developed countries will
support compulsory licensing through an import country
because it increases the chance of parallel importation of
cheaper medicines.
C. THE INTERPRETATION OF TRIPS
On November 14, 2001, the WTO adopted the Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.200  The final
194. See McCabe, supra note 74, at 61 (stating that “[g]iven the negotiating
position of the developed countries, it is unlikely that they would agree to a
relaxation of the restrictions on compulsory licenses”).
195. See EU’s Paper, supra note 93; see also TRIPS, supra note 44.
196. TRIPS, supra note 44..
197. See Nash, supra note 125, at 500.
198. Id.
199. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining injuries from parallel imports).
200. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO
(adopted 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/wto/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.ht
m [hereinafter Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement] (last visited Oct. 14,
2002). The Declaration also extends the date for poor nations to comply with
the patent rules to 2016.  Id. at para. 7; see also, C. Rammanohar Reddy,
Agreement at Doha to soften TRIPS provisions, HINDU, Nov. 14, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 30300681.  On June 27, 2002, the WTO council
responsible for intellectual property approved a decision that extends the
transition period for least-developed countries to 2016.  Council Approves LDC
Decision with Additional Waiver, WTO News: 2002 Press Releases, (June 28,
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agreement was brought together by Brazil, on behalf of the
developing countries, and the U.S., on behalf of the developed
countries.201  The declaration recognizes the importance of
patents, yet reaffirms the right to issue a compulsory license
during an emergency.202  Prior to the declaration, developing
countries had the right to issue compulsory licenses in the
event of a health emergency, yet the definition of a national
emergency was vague.203  The declaration’s interpretation of
TRIPS reaffirms the right of a country to grant a compulsory
license, allows each country to determine what constitutes a
national emergency, and recommends that other countries
should not prevent a country from taking measures to protect
public health.204  As a result of reaffirming the right to issue a
compulsory license according to each country’s definition of a
national emergency without any insecurity or fear of sanctions,
a developing country may be more likely to take action to
promote public health such as issuing compulsory licensing
itself.  Daniel Berman, from Doctors Without Borders, explains
that due to this declaration “it is doubtful that a wealthy
country would dare file a dispute against a developing country
for using . . . compulsory licensing.”205  Therefore, the
declaration could be seen as an accommodating interpretation
of the compulsory licensing provision.
However, upon closer examination, the declaration is not
legally binding.  The declaration was neither an amendment
nor a modification.206  As one U.S. official pointed out, the
2002), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr301_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2002).
201. Frances Williams, Declaration on Patent Rules Cheers Developing
Nations, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 15, 2001, at 11.
202. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 200, at paras. 3-5.
203. See TRIPS, supra note 44, at art. 31(b); see also Melody Petersen, U.S.
Companies Largely Back Trade Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at C3
(noting that the declaration made it clear that “each country has a right to
grant compulsory licenses and to determine what constitutes a health
emergency”).
204. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 200, at paras. 4,5(c)
and 7.  It can be argued that this provision (TRIPS art. 31(b)) was added to
allow the U.S. the necessary means to determine that the Anthrax incidences
are a national emergency, therefore allowing compulsory licensing if needed.
205. Activists Welcome WTO Accord on Drug Patents, REUTERS MEDICAL
NEWS, Nov. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.medformation.com/mf/news.nsf/ReutersNews/Activists_welcome_
WTO_accord_on_drug_patents (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
206. Although a political declaration is not binding law, if it was ever
challenged in the Dispute Settlement Body, and upheld, it would receive the
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declaration is “‘a political and not legal text’ and that ‘the
statement does not add or subtract to TRIPS.’”207  As a result,
the declaration is not legally binding and does not have the
legal force as an amendment or modification.
In addition, the declaration highlights the need to find a
means that would allow countries without manufacturing
capabilities to use compulsory licensing, but it does not assist
those countries.208  “[T]he TRIPS council has been given until
the end of next year [2002] to find an ‘expeditious solution’ to
the question of how countries without local drug industries can
make ‘effective use of compulsory licensing.’”209  Also, the
declaration did not decide whether developing countries may
issue compulsory licenses to producers in other countries to
produce medicines for them.210  Therefore, the declaration,
although useful in interpreting compulsory licensing and
providing limited security to developing countries with
production capabilities authorized to use a compulsory license,
is not legally binding, and it is unable to address the HIV/AIDS
crisis in poorer developing countries that do not have
production capabilities.
III.ANOTHER SOLUTION
A declaratory interpretation of TRIPS alone is unable to
address the issues of patent protection and the HIV/AIDS
crisis.  However, the interpretation presented by the WTO,
coupled with a modification to TRIPS, will have more authority
authority of law.
207. Reddy, supra note 200.
208. See Celia W. Dugger, A Catch-22 on Drugs for the World’s Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at W1.
209. Geoff Dyer, Activists See Flaws in Drug Patent Proposal, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Nov. 16, 2001, at 13 (referring to Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 200, at 6).  Since the Declaration, proposals have been
submitted by the U.S., EC, and a group of developing countries, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cuba, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. The EC proposal
suggests four options, one of which is an amendment to Article 31 of TRIPS.
However, the U.S. proposal recommends using the flexibility of Article 31 of
TRIPS, rather than modifying TRIPS.  The Developing Countries’ Proposal
considered deleting Article 31(f) of TRIPS or amending 31(k) of TRIPS;
however the preferred solution is an authoritative interpretation of Article 30
of TRIPS.  Access to Medicines in Spotlight at TRIPS Council, 6 BRIDGES
WEEKLY, June 26, 2002, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-06-
26/story3.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
210. See Dugger, supra note 208.
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and persuasion to solve the problem.  To negotiate and resolve
issues between disagreeing parties, it is necessary to look at
each party’s ultimate goals.  It is apparent that the developed
nations want stronger intellectual property protection, while
developing nations desire medicines for their infected
populations.
A. DIFFERENTIAL PRICING AND THIRD PARTY PRODUCERS
Differential pricing allows for lower prices in developing
countries, developing countries gain access to medicines while
drug companies maintain high prices in profitable markets.211
Pharmaceutical companies have already begun to lower their
prices and/or give patents to developing countries.212  Michael
Scholtz, who is now working for the World Health Organization
after 21 years as a manager at Ciba-Geigy and SmithKline
Beecham, says, “lost profits from a price cut in Africa would
amount to no more than ‘three days’ fluctuation of exchange
rates.”213  Therefore, differential pricing could be set and
monitored to ensure lower prices.  If the prices of medicines
were set according to each developing country’s gross domestic
product (GDP), developing countries would be ensured a
reasonable price.  However, setting the price of medicines
according to GDP may be problematic.  The UN tried to control
the pace of negotiations and the flow of drugs with five
pharmaceutical companies.214  One year later, “the effort had
resulted in deals with only three countries – Uganda, Senegal
and Rwanda – and promised to cover only a few thousand
Africans.”215  Thus, past experience with the UN shows that
controlling negotiations fails to produce quick results.216
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies are concerned that
differentially priced medicines “will undermine their prices in
the high-income markets.”217  Lowering their prices to cost will
bring attention to the high profit margins gained in developing
countries.  As a result, populations within developed countries,
who are paying ten times the amount of rock bottom prices,
211. See Reinhold, supra note 3, at 6.
212. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
213. Gellman, supra note 11.
214. See Blustien & Gellman, supra note 16, at A13.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Sachs, supra note 19, at 87.
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may demand that their prices drop as well.218  Also, if the
differentially priced medicines are parallel imported into high-
income markets then the pharmaceutical companies will lose
profits.219  Furthermore, in some low-income markets profits
can actually be higher “as [a] result of a few high-priced sales
to a narrow segment of rich customers as opposed to broad-
based sales at close-to-production cost.”220  Thus,
pharmaceutical companies do not have an incentive to continue
lowering their prices.
Rather than setting and monitoring price, competition may
provide a better means to drive down prices.  In many poorer
countries, like South Africa, “consumers do not enjoy the strong
competition found in more developed economies.”221  Also,
poorer countries do not have the capabilities to create their own
competition.222  Thus, exporting generics may be the means to
develop competition and “drastically lower the price of drugs.”223
If a country were to accept generic imports, pharmaceutical
companies would have to compete with “generic versions often
cost[ing] 80 to 90 percent less than the brand-name product.”224
However, according to interpretations of TRIPS Agreement
31(f), generic drug producers of patented medicines should only
be in those countries that already have a compulsory license
due to their own emergency.225
However, if 31(f) was interpreted to allow a developing
country to assign its compulsory license to another country that
already retains its own compulsory license and has the
capabilities to produce medicines, then competition may be
created causing reduction in prices.  In addition, restricting
third party compulsory licensing to a producer in a country who
is already in a state of emergency will direct the Global Funds
to a country who is in need of economic stimulation.
Hereinafter, a compulsory license from a country in a state of
emergency without capabilities of production to a producer in
another country who is also in a state of emergency will be
218. See Gellman, supra note 11, at A13.
219. See Sachs, supra note 19, at 87-88.
220. See id. at 88.
221. Snyder, supra note 33, at 195.
222. See Harrelson, supra note 51, at 177.
223. Snyder, supra note 33, at 196.
224. See Stephen Buckley, U.S., Brazil Clash Over AIDS Drugs, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at A1.
225. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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known as “restricted third party compulsory licensing.”
Due to the creation of competition, third party compulsory
licensing may be able to bring to developing countries
medicines from the original producer.  Dr. Mark Wainberg,
former president of the International AIDS Society and a
professor of medicine at McGill University, states “that it
would be ‘far superior’ if developing countries obtained AIDS
drugs from the pharmaceutical companies that originally
developed them rather than from generic drug makers,
‘particularly companies without proven track records.’”226
Critics are fearful that “generic drugs that are not
manufactured at full strength may ‘fail the patient and may
also foster the growth of drug resistant viruses.”227  Thus, due to
the potential harm that could result to the patient and
community, it would be best for developing countries to receive
their medicines from the original producers.
However, it may be questioned whether pharmaceutical
companies, even with the pressures of competition, would be
able to lower their prices for poorer countries.  According to
Reuters Health, the government of the Ivory Coast “told
various people that patented medicines from originating brand
companies have been as cheap or cheaper than generic
versions.”228  Thus, noting the Ivory Cost as an example,
pharmaceutical companies may be able to reduce prices low
enough for the poor to afford.  However, even if pharmaceutical
companies in developed countries do not lower prices, restricted
third party licensing provides a means for developing countries
to receive access to medicines.229
B. EXHAUSTION
Restricted third party compulsory licensing may create
competition and reduce prices.  However, it may not be
226. Inside the Industry AIDS RX: Experts Question Quality of Foreign
Generics, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE, Apr. 25, 2001.
227. Id.
228. AIDS Drugs: Easing Patent Laws Won’t Help, Thompson Says, AM.
HEALTH LINE, May 17, 2001 (quoting Harvey Bale, the head of the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association).  This
article is a report of Tommy Thompson, the Health and Human Services
Secretary, speaking at a meeting of the World Health Assembly.
229. Although restricted third party compulsory licensing may not provide
developing countries with ‘far superior’ medicines, patients in developing
countries “are probably more fearful of not having any medical attention than
receiving imposter drugs.” Snyder, supra note 33, at 196.
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accepted as a solution by the developed countries.  Developed
countries may fear that restricted third party compulsory
licensing will increase parallel importing to developed
countries, thus injuring pharmaceutical companies’ profit
margins.230  Without stronger intellectual property protection
laws, developed countries are less likely to agree to this
solution.
Therefore, the TRIPS exhaustion article should be modified
to solve for the parallel importing problem.  The International
Intellectual Property Institute suggests that if there were a
global adoption of a national exhaustion scheme similar to the
type used by the United States, “pharmaceutical companies
would be protected against parallel importing.”231  As a result of
eliminating parallel importing, except between countries that
are both in states of emergencies, pharmaceutical companies
may be more willing to agree to restricted third party
compulsory licensing.232  In addition, a global adoption of a
national exhaustion scheme would not limit a capable country’s
ability to issue a compulsory license, to manufacture, and to
use this ability as a negotiating tool.233
C. THE NEGOTIATION AND BARGAIN
In order for developing countries in a state of emergency to
gain the means to issue their compulsory license to third party
producers in a country, they will need to negotiate and bargain
with the developed countries.  Also, in order for the developed
countries to receive global adoption of a national exhaustion
scheme, they will need to negotiate and bargain with the
developing countries.
Unlike developed countries, developing countries’ ultimate
goals are not to have a national exhaustion scheme.  Currently,
“developing nations have opposed national exhaustion.”234
230. See supra notes 172 and 173 and accompanying text.
231. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 198.
232. Conversely, if the pharmaceutical companies do not need to fear the
parallel importation of their drugs, or loss of profits, they may continue to
lower their prices even farther as a result of humanitarian pressures.
233. Poor countries with the ability to manufacture may use this scheme as
a negotiating tool to lower prices. Thailand, Brazil and China are such
countries. Brazil threatened compulsory licensing and it prompted various
pharmaceutical companies to reduce their prices. See Jennifer L. Rich, Roche
Reaches Accord on Drug with Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, at C1. China
potentially has the power to do the same.
234. Harrelson, supra note 51, at 198.
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However, their ultimate goals are to have medicines available
to their infected populations.  Thus, if restricted third party
compulsory licensing were available, developing countries
would favor a national exhaustion scheme.235  Also, developed
countries do not support compulsory licensing or even third
party compulsory licensing for fear of parallel imports.236
However, if the developing countries supported a
modification to the TRIPS agreement that defined the
exhaustion scheme, the developed countries would be likely to
support a modification of TRIPS to allow for restricted third
party compulsory licensing.  Also, restricting third party
compulsory licensing limits the competition and following price
reduction to only developing countries in extreme need.  These
restrictions may make it easier for pharmaceutical companies
to explain the price reduction to the wealthy nations.  WHO
official Michael Sholtz suggests telling the consumer “[y]ou can
have the same deal when you are living on a dollar a day.”237
By using a large-scale publicized campaign, backed by public
health agencies, the wealthy nations’ populations should be
able to tolerate the price reduction to assist solving the
HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries.238  Although
convincing the wealthy population to tolerate the price
difference may be difficult, the pharmaceutical companies may
agree in order to gain a global adoption of a national
exhaustion scheme.  Ultimately, the developed and developing
countries should be able to agree on a modification which
allows for restricted third party compulsory licensing in
exchange for a global adoption of a national exhaustion scheme.
Through this modification, both developing and developed
countries reach their ultimate goals.
D. MODIFICATION BEST MEANS
A modification to TRIPS should be used to allow for
restricted third party compulsory licensing and exhaustion
schemes.  It has a greater likelihood of adoption than an
amendment, and more legal standing than a declaration.  As
235. See id. (stating that “[t]he economic interests of developing countries
would favor national exhaustion if tiered pricing and subsidies were
available”).  Along a similar path, parallel imports would provide developing
countries cheaper medicines adjacent to their economic interests.
236. See supra notes 172, 173, 197-199 and accompanying text.
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238. See id.
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noted earlier, a declaration is merely a political statement; yet
a modification or an amendment to TRIPS has legal binding
power.239  A modification is easier to pass than an amendment.
Article 71 appears to suggest that the “TRIPS Council has the
authority to make modifications to the TRIPS Agreement
without forwarding such modifications to the full Ministerial
Conference of the WTO.”240  Since the TRIPS Council is smaller
than the Ministerial Conference, it is more likely that support
will be found within the TRIPS council.241  Thus, a modification
to TRIPS should be used to address the issues of restricted
third party compulsory licensing and exhaustion schemes,
rather than a declaration or an amendment.
CONCLUSION
Patent law, through the implementation of TRIPS, secures
profits for patentees from would-be copiers to provide funding
for research and development, and allows for disclosure so
inventors may continue to build on the knowledge of the
patentee.  However, the current HIV/AIDS crisis requires
assistance.  Although there are many pressing issues, providing
HIV/AIDS medicines to developing nations is important.
Ministerial drafts from both the developing and developed
countries illuminate this dispute in detail.  Using both drafts as
guides, the declaration provides flexibility and security to
countries that issue compulsory licenses.  However, the
declaration is not legally binding, nor does it provide a means
for developing countries without manufacturing capabilities to
receive medicines.  Therefore, a modification to TRIPS is
necessary.  The modification should contain a means to transfer
a compulsory license to a third party after meeting certain
requirements as well as global exhaustion based upon a
national scheme.  A modification to TRIPS should provide low-
priced medicines to the developing countries in exchange for an
exhaustion scheme desired by developed countries.
239. Unlike a deceleration, a modification will be integrated into the
TRIPS agreement and have legal power.
240. McCabe, supra note 74, at 63.
241. Id. at 64.  A TRIPS council must forward amendments to the
Ministerial Conference for consideration.  As the Ministerial Conference is a
larger body, proposed amendments are thus more likely to be rejected here.
However, the Council has the authority to make modifications, and since it is
a smaller body, the supporting countries should be able to obtain support.
